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Pursuant to Rule 24(c) of thq Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Appellants (Homeowners), suing derivatively on behalf of 
the American Towers Homeowners Association, file this Reply Brief. 
INTRODUCTION 
In their Responding Brief, much as they did in the court 
below, Appellees (the Trustees) frame the issues in what appears to 
be a studied effort to confuse and deflect the Court's attention 
from the complexity of the issues before it. On appeal, Homeowners 
challenge solely, whether, in light of the facts contained in their 
Complaint, the trial court erred as a matter of law in dismissing 
the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Were this simply an issue governed by the four corners 
of the Utah Nonprofit Corporation Act (Nonprofit Act), Utah Code 
Ann. § 16-6-54 through § 16-6-112 (1995 & Supp. 1996), as the 
Trustees claim, there would be no issue for appeal. However, this 
case involves significant issues impacting the rights of 
condominium owners. This case raises a question of first 
impression regarding the correct interpretation of the Utah 
Condominium Act (Condominium Act or the Act) , Utah Code Ann. § 57-
8-1 et. seq. (1995 & Supp. 1996), and the rights and duties 
conferred by the Condominium Act.1 Further, this case concerns the 
proper application of settled contract principles to the unique 
1
 Just as a condominium is neither a house nor an apartment, 
but falls somewhere in between, the law regarding a breach of a 
condominium bylaw is neither solely nonprofit corporate law nor 
solely for-profit corporate law -— but is a studied combination of 
both. 
1 
circumstances relating to the proper operation and management of 
condominium associations and boards, 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When reviewing a trial court's dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court must accept the 
material allegations of the complaint as true and consider those 
allegations and all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable 
to the complainant. Colman Vt Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 
624 (Utah 1990). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper 
only where the claimant would not be entitled to relief under the 
facts alleged in the complaint "or under any state of fact they 
could prove to support their claim." Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764, 
766 (Utah 1991) (emphasis added). This Court may affirm the trial 
court's ruling only if it clearly appears, that as a matter of law, 
the complainant can prove no set of facts in support of his or her 
claims. Educators Mutual Inst Ass'n Vt Allied Prppt & Cast Inst 
£a, 890 p.2d 1029, 1030 (Utah 1995); £££ Wright Vt University of 
Utah, 876 P.2d 380, 382 (Utah App. 1994). To this end, this Court 
has stated 
[D]ismissal of a claim under Rule 
12(b)(6) is a severe measure given the 
liberality of notice pleading . . . When 
challenging a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) 
the appellant is entitled to a generous 
standard of review. 
Wright 876 P.2d at 390 (Billings, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) 
(citation omitted) (quoting Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson. Inc.r 815 
P.2d 1356, 1360 (Utah App. 1991)). Finally, the propriety of a 
Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal presents a question of law this Court 
2 
reviews for correctness, giving no deference to the lower court's 
decision. St. Benedict's Dev. Co, v. St. Benedict's HOSD,, 811 
P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE ASSOCIATION IS ORGANIZED PURSUANT TO THE UTAH 
CONDOMINIUM ACT, § 57-8-1 et seq. AND IS SUPPLEMENTALLY 
GOVERNED BY BOTH THE REVISED BUSINESS CORPORATIONS ACT, 
S 16-10a-101 to -1705 AND THE UTAH NONPROFIT CORPORATION 
ACT, § 16-6-54 to -112. 
In Point I of their Brief, the Trustees erroneously contend 
the Nonprofit Act is dispositive of Homeowners' claims in this 
case. Rather, it is the Condominium Act, acting in concert with 
all other relevant law, that governs this case and is therefore 
dispositive of Homeowners' claims. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-8-35(1) 
(1995) . 
In relevant part, the Condominium Act provides 
(1) The provisions of this act shall be 
in addition and supplemental to all other 
provisions of law, statutorily or judicially 
declared, provided that where the application 
of the provisions of this act conflict with 
the application of such other provisions, illis 
act shall prevail-
Id. (emphasis added). The American Towers Homeowners Association 
(the Association) has expressly incorporated the Condominium Act 
into its Declaration and Bylaws. See Article X § 10.07 (R. 67); 
Article I § 1.14 (R. 56); Article XX § 20.02 (R. 85); see also 
Homeowners' Opening Brief at 32-33. Undisputedly, the Condominium 
Act governs Homeowners' claims. 
Recognizing the inescapable application of the Condominium Act 
to the facts alleged in the instant case, the Trustees contend that 
3 
while the Act ^ primarily governs the instant action, because it 
contains no requisite standard of care for the elected officers and 
directors of the Association's Board of Trustees, the court must 
look to the Nonprofit Act for guidance. The Trustees read too much 
into the Condominium Act and erroneously overstate the Condominium 
Act's terms. 
It is clear, and the Trustees concede, § 57-8-35(1) contains 
no specifications regarding what "other provisions of law" shall 
supplement the Condominium Act. Certainly the legislature intended 
the Condominium Act be read in harmony with other law, however, the 
legislature failed to provide which law(s) should apply. It is at 
least arguable, and indeed compelling, that the legislature 
likewise intended the Utah Revised Business Corporation Act 
(Business Act) to be considered when interpreting the Condominium 
Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-101 to -1750 (1995). 
A fundamental tenet of statutory construction provides that 
when there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning or application 
of a statute, courts must analyze the statute in its entirety, in 
light of its objectives, and harmonize the statute with legislative 
intent and purpose. Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P. 2d 1037, 
104 5 (Utah 1991). Read as a whole, the Condominium Act neither 
expressly refers to nor relies upon the Nonprofit Act. Further, 
when harmonizing the full text of § 57-8-35, the section in 
controversy, the language of this section suggests it relates to 
such "other provisions of law" regarding the zoning, development, 
approval, and recording of plats — property law, not civil 
4 
liability, statutes.2 Finally, when laying the Nonprofit Act and 
the Condominium Act side-by-side, there is far more discord than 
harmony among the separate acts.3 
Certainly, there are differences between the Condominium Act 
and the Nonprofit Act. And, in part, those differences are 
2
 Section 57-8-35(1) expressly refers to Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-
9-25(regarding municipal land use and development); 10-9-26 (same); 
17-21-8 (regarding recording and approval of maps and plats); 17-
27-21 (regarding county land use and development); and 57-5-3 
(regarding plats and subdivisions). Subsections (2), (3), and (4) 
all relate to future development, zoning, and compliance with 
municipal and county property ordinances. 
3
 In relevant part: (1) The Condominium Act governs the 
collective ownership and possession of fee simple property. See 
Id. §§ 57-8-6, -7. The Nonprofit Act makes no mention of real 
property rights or condominium associations. See Id. § 16-16-108 
(term "cooperative association" refers to agricultural cooperative 
not condominiums; § 16-6-21 (includes no reference to the 
Condominium Act, condominiums, or condominium associations in 
exhaustive list of statute's purposes); (2) The Condominium Act 
mandates that condominium associations create declarations and 
bylaws, to be executed and acknowledged by all owners and lessees 
and duly recorded, and that each owner shall strictly comply with 
the bylaws. See Id. §§ 57-8-8, -10, -12, -16. The Nonprofit Act 
does not require bylaws. See; id. § 16-6-44. (3) The Condominium 
Act provides "common profits of the property shall be distributed 
to . . . the unit owners according to their respective percentage 
of fractional undivided interests . . .." Id. § 57-9-24. The 
Nonprofit Act regards only "corporations] which [do] not 
distribute any part of its income to its members, trustees, or 
officers . . . ." j^ L. § 16-6-19(11), and "[n]o part of the net 
earnings of a nonprofit corporation may inure to or for the benefit 
of or be distributable to the corporations1 members . . . ." Id. 
§ 16-6-42. 
With respect to (3), on page 11 of their Brief, the Trustees 
contend "Homeowners have never alleged that this Association 
distributes profits to members, trustees, or officers," and 
therefore the instant Association must be a nonprofit corporation. 
This is a distinction without a difference. Simply because the 
Association, up to this point, has not distributed its profits does 
not foreclose the fact that the Association may do so in the future 
or that, in this regard, the Association is much more akin to a far 
profit corporation than a nonprofit corporation. 
5 
material and extreme. The state legislature did not intend for 
courts — such as the lower court — to harmonize such inapposite 
statutory provisions to give effect to an ambiguous statute. 
Rather, when "dealing with an unclear statute," — such as § 57-8-
35(1) — Utah courts must render interpretations that ""will best 
promote the protection of the public. |W Cloverf 808 P.2d at 1045 
(quoting Curtis v. Harmon Electronics, 575 P. 2d 1044, 1046 (Utah 
1978)). Reading too much into § 57-8-35(1) as the district court 
did below and as the Trustees likewise urge this Court to do on 
appeal, promotes the Trustees', not the public's interest, and 
permits the Trustees to profit from their misdeeds. Such reading 
allows the Trustees to violate express covenants, conditions, and 
bylaws of the Association. Clearly, such an interpretation permits 
acts that would violate the homeowners' interests. 
In relevant part, the competing statutes ~ § 16-6-107 of the 
Nonprofit Act and § 16-10a-840 of the Business Act — provide: 
(1) A trustee or officer of a nonprofit 
corporation is not personally liable to the 
corporation or its members for civil claims 
arising from acts or omissions made in the 
performance of his duties as a trustee or 
officer, unless the acts or omissions are the 
result of his intentional misconduct. 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-107(1) (1995) (emphasis added). 
(4) A director or officer is not liable 
to the corporation, its shareholders, or any 
conservator or receiver, or any assignees or 
successor-in-interest thereof, for any action 
taken, or any failure to take any action, as 
an officer or director, as the case may be, 
unless: 
(a) the director or officer has 
breached or failed to perform the 
duties of the officer in compliance 
with this section; and 
(b) the breach or failure to 
perform constitutes gross 
negligence, willful misconduct, or 
intentional infliction of harm on 
the corporation or the shareholders. 
Id, § 16-10a-840(4) (emphasis added).4 
At the hearing on The Trustees1 Motion to Dismiss on August 9, 
1996, the lower court expressly recognized the application of both 
the Business and Nonprofit Acts to the facts in this case. In 
relevant part, the district court stated: 
Under the Utah Nonprofit Corporation Act 
it goes, if at all, to torts. But you have to 
superimpose on that the Utah Condominium Actt 
And it brings in the Utah General Business 
Corporation Act. The very fact [the 
Association] put in an indemnification 
provision in their Bylaws, there is no 
indemnification provision in the Utah 
Nonprofit Corporations Law. But when you sort 
through this, it's not just the Utah Non-
profit Corporation Act that controls here* 
(R. 496-97). The Trustees attempt to explain away this statement 
in a brief footnote located on page 15 of their Brief. Contrary to 
The Trustees1 claim, the district court was not merely restating 
Homeowners' argument, but was recognizing that § 57-8-35(1) is 
ambiguous and that both the "Utah General Business Corporations Act" 
and the "Utah Non-Profit Corporation Act" apply. Indeed, the lower 
4
 Prior to May 3, 1993, the standard of care for directors and 
officers was simple negligence. The substantive amendment changing 
the standard of care to gross negligence is not retroactive, 
Resort ion Trust Corpt yf Hess, 820 F. supp. 1359, 1364-67 (D. Utah 
1993), and therefore acts which occurred before May 3, 1993, 
including the February 11, 1993 closed-door meeting in which the 
Trustees decided to misappropriate funds from the reserve fund, are 
subject to the lower, simple negligence standard of care. 
7 
court expressly recognized the problem created by § 57-8-35's 
ambiguity, yet, in derogation of legislative intent, the court went 
on to state without explanation: 
I don't think there is wisdom in 
attempting to apply multiple acts and then 
trying to determine from those acts- where 
there could be a potential for a different 
standard to be applied to Directors of 
Nonprofit Condominium Associations and 
Nonprofit Corporations. . . . 
• • • • 
So, Mr. Manning, your Motion to Dismiss 
is Granted. 
(R. 496-97). 
In so ruling, the district court placed itself in the shoes of 
the state legislature, ignored fundamental rules of statutory 
construction, and without balancing the competing statues, declared 
by judicial fiat the standard of care for condominium officers and 
directors. £££ Salt Lake Child and Family Therapy Clinic, Inct Vt 
Frederick. 890 P. 2d 1017, 1024 (Utah 1995) ("The Legislature 
expects courts to apply statutes, . . . with some degree of common 
sense to particular situation. The Legislature does not expect 
courts to effectuate what they think is good policy-")) (emphasis 
added). Reading § 57-8-35(1) as the lower court did compels absurd 
results, results which contradict the lower courts own findings: 
The district court recognized the ambiguity in § 57-8-3 5; the 
district court recognized the relevant application of both the 
Business Act and the Nonprofit Act; thus, the district court 
recognized Homeowners had stated a claim — under the bylaws and 
the "Utah General Business Corporations Act"— upon which relief 
8 
could be granted. Inexplicably, however, the district reversed 
itself and dismissed Homeowners complaint in contravention of Rule 
12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
If the court had applied, as it recognized it ought to, a 
"gross negligence" standard of care, the allegations contained in 
Homeowners' Complaint more than adequately state a claim for 
relief.5 In part, Count IV alleges facts legally sufficient to 
support a finding of "simple" negligence for the Trustees' pre-May 
3, 1993 acts. Count V alleges facts legally sufficient to support 
a finding of "gross" negligence for the Trustees' post-May 3, 1993 
ultra vires acts. This Court should therefore reverse the lower 
court's dismissal.6 
In part "gross negligence" has been interpreted to mean "a 
want of ordinary care and diligence." Warren v. Robison, 57 P. 
287, 291 (Utah 1899). Moreover, as this Court must, when 
construing the instant Complaint in a light most favorable to 
Homeowners1 and drawing all reasonable inferences in Homeowners' 
favor, oisgn Vt Park-Craig-Qlson, Ingt, 815 p.2d 1356, 1360 (Utah 
App. 1991), it is reasonable to infer Homeowners have alleged 
conduct akin to an intentional and willful act. See Wright v. 
University of Utah, 876 P.2d 880, 890 (Utah App. 1994) (Billings, 
J. , dissenting) (finding that where plaintiff alleged employee 
"assaulted and struck" her, it reasonable could be inferred 
plaintiff claim both an intentional and negligent act). 
6
 In their Brief, the Trustees likewise contend the breach of 
fiduciary duties and negligent management claims contained in 
Homeowners' Complaint must fail as they too are based upon an 
"intentional misconduct" standard of care. Again, the Trustees err. 
Rather, when a homeowner volunteers to sit on a condominium 
homeowner board, the homeowner assumes the fiduciary duties of 
care, obedience, and diligence, which duties the homeowner breaches 
by its negligent acts. Homeowners' Complaint sufficiently alleges 
facts which show the Trustees breached these duties in the instant 
case. 
9 
II. TRUSTEES MUST STRICTLY COMPLY WITH THE DECLARATION AND 
BYLAWS AND THE OWNERS HAVE STANDING TO SUE FOR THEIR 
FAILURE TO SO COMPLY. 
A. As Owners, Trustees are Contractually 
Obligated to Strictly Comply with the 
Declaration and Bylaws. 
The Trustees further contend Homeowners have failed to state 
a upon which the court may find a breach of contract. The Trustees 
concede the condominium Bylaws, together with the Articles of 
Incorporation and the members1 applications constitute a contract 
between the members and the corporation. Turner v. Hi-Country 
Homeowner's Ass'nr 910 P.2d 1223, 1225 (Utah 1996). Conversely, 
the Trustees argue that as individuals, the Trustees are not a 
party to this contract and accordingly, may not be sued under it. 
The Trustees claim the agreement to establish the Reserve 
Account (which account the Trustees mismanaged) is between the 
Association and the owners and that the Trustees had no part in 
this agreement. As a general principle, a condominium 
association's declaration and bylaws form part of "an elaborate 
contract among the individuals owning and sharing property in the 
community." P.M. Dunbar, The Homeowners Association Manual/ at 5-6 
(2 ed. 1991) . Under this contract, each owner is entitled to 
"defend their contract rights and to resist efforts of those who 
would impair or take them away . . . . [including] arbitrary action 
of the board of directors." Id. (emphasis added). 
In the instant case, the Trustees themselves are owners and 
therefore parties to this "elaborate contract." The Trustees are 
also the elected officers and representatives of the collective 
10 
homeowners, charged with upholding their will. It is untenable to 
suggest, as the Trustees do, that once elected, the Trustees were 
somehow released from their reciprocal duty (as owners) to strictly 
comply with the contract. Rather, once elected to serve as 
trustees, the Trustees undertook a dual obligation (1) as owners, 
to strictly comply with the Declaration and Bylaws (the contract), 
(R. 83) , and (2) as agents, to carry out their duties consistent 
with the rights and obligations contained in the Declaration and 
Bylaws (the contract). (R. 121). The Trustees cite no authority, 
and indeed there is none, to support their claim that once elected, 
they became relieved of their obligation to comply with the 
contract.7 Because the Trustees are in the unique position of 
being parties — by virtue of their status as owners — and agents 
to the contract, they may be held liable and indeed sued for breach 
of this contract. 
Clearly, under Rules 8(a) and (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and pursuant to the Utah Supreme Court's recent 
pronouncement in Broadwater Vt Old Republic Surt, «54 P.2d 527, 536 
7
 In an attempt to avoid their obvious contractual liability 
in this case, the Trustees assert that they, like any other "agent" 
cannot be held individually liable for the contractual obligations 
of their principle. The Trustees rely on the recent Utah Supreme 
Court decision in Carlie v. MorganP 922 P.2d 1, 6 (Utah 1996), in 
which the court held an implied warranty of habitability may not be 
enforced against an agent who entered into a contract on behalf of 
a disclosed principle. Carlie is distinguishable from the instant 
case. First, Carlie concerns an implied term and not an express 
contact. Next, the agent in Carlie had no stake in and was not 
otherwise a party to the implied contract. Here, the Trustees are 
both parties to the contract — they are owners as well as officers 
— who have been elected by the other owners to enforce and uphold 
the express contract terms. As such, the Trustees may be sued in 
contract for their failure to do so. 
11 
(Utah 1993), the same facts giving rise,to a tort claim, i.e., the 
Trustees1 negligent mismanagement of the Reserve Account, may also 
give rise to a separate contract claim. Thus, even assuming 
arguendo Homeowners' have not plead the appropriate tort standard 
of care in this case, such failure cannot and shall not effect the 
validity of Homeowners1 well-plead and legally cognizable contract 
claims. Accordingly, this Court must reverse the district court's 
erroneous dismissal of Homeowners contract claims and allow 
Homeowners to proceed to trial on those issues. 
B. The Trustees Are Bound to Strictly Comply with 
Declaration and Bylaws. 
In support of their contention that the individual trustees 
may not be sued in contract, the Trustees claim that neither the 
text of the Declaration and Bylaws nor Utah law dictate that they 
"strictly comply" with the "contract." In so claiming, the 
Trustees again oversimplify the issues in this case and distort the 
reality regarding their status both as owners and agents. This 
Court must be wary to accept such broad-sweeping claims — which 
claims the Trustees predicate on generalized contract principles 
with no application, or only limited application, to the law 
regarding condominium associations. See Booneville Properties, 
Inc. v. Simons, 677 P.2d 1111, 1112 (Utah 1984) (holding that where 
association has adopted internal rules and regulations which 
members have agreed to be governed by, controversies arising 
therein shall be determined by internal rules and not general 
contract law). Homeowners have not made this mistake. Rather, 
Homeowners Opening Brief is squarely premised upon the Declaration 
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and Bylaws and the difficult and evolving principles of law 
regarding condominiums. 
In part, Utah Code Ann. § 57-8-8 and Article XVIII Section 
18.01 of the Declaration refer to owners, not trustees. (R. 83). 
However, as stated herein, with regard to condominium associations 
in which the governing board is comprised of homeowners, this is a 
distinction without a difference. Both the Utah Code and 
Declaration set forth the reciprocal duty of all homeowners — 
including the Trustees in this case, who have been elected from the 
pool of homeowners to serve those homeowners' interests. As 
owners, the Trustees are independently held to a duty of "strict 
compliance" with the Condominium Act and the Associations' 
Declaration and Bylaws. The Trustees dual-status as trustees and 
owners does not extinguish this duty. Indeed, it makes the duty 
more all the more relevant. See e.g.
 f Badger v. Madsen, 896 P. 2d 
20, 23 (Utah App. 1995) (stating courts require strict compliance 
where failure to adhere to contract requirement will effect 
substantive rights and result in possible prejudice.) 
Homeowners Complaint sufficiently alleges the Trustees' 
failure to strictly adhere to the requirements of the Utah Code 
and the Association's Declaration and Bylaws. The Complaint 
therefore states an enforceable claim for breach of contract. 
Accordingly, this Court must reverse the district court's erroneous 
dismissal of Homeowners' Complaint.8 
8
 In a further effort to defeat their clear contractual 
obligations, the Trustees contend in their Brief to this Court, 
that even if they are bound to a duty of strict compliance, the 
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C. The Trustees Committed Numerous Ultra Vires 
Acts for Which Homeowners are Entitled to 
Relief Under Both the Business Act and the 
Nonprofit Act. 
In their Brief, the Trustees argue that if they are guilty of 
anything, they are guilty only of intra vires acts — acts which 
were authorized, but imperfectly executed. As such, the Trustees 
contend that Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-23, which expressly permits the 
instant action, has no bearing on this case. 
It is settled that an ultra vires act is an act that exceeds 
the actor's authority — regardless of whether the act was 
intentional or not. Ultra vires acts include not only acts "wholly 
beyond the scope of the authority of the corporation, but also 
[acts] apparently within the scope of authority but actually, in 
the particular case, for a purpose not within the authority of the 
corporation." William M. Fletcher, Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law 
of Private Corporations § 3550 (Perm. ed. 1989) ; see also Black's 
Law Dictionary 1365 (5th ed. 1979) ("The term [ultra vires] has a 
Trustees have strictly complied in this case. In part, the 
Trustees argue that because Article XIX Section 19.05 of the 
Declaration does not specifically prohibit Trustees from diverting 
funds from the reserve account to finance expensive litigation, 
that section gives them the necessary discretion to act as they did 
in this case. The text of the Declaration, however, is to the 
contrary. (R. 84). Article X Section 10.03, states in relevant 
part, "[T]he Association may acquire and pay for out of the Common 
Expense Fund" — not the Reserve Account — "legal and accounting 
services necessary or desirable in connection with the operation of 
the Project or the enforcement of this Declaration." (R. 67) 
Certainly, the Trustees1 use of the Reserve Account in this case 
contravenes the Declaration's clear directives and therefore, even 
if Trustees were entitled to exercise some degree of discretion — 
which they are not — in obtaining such legal services, they abused 
this discretion in this case. Moreover, the Trustees failed to 
obtain homeowner consent. 
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broad application and includes not only acts prohibited by the 
charter, but acts which are in excess of powers granted and not 
prohibited, and generally applie[s] . . . when the corporation has 
the power but exercises it irregularly") . The Trustees claim that 
because the Association, acting through the Trustees, has the power 
to sue and be sued, " [t]here can be no question that the 
prosecution of the CCI Litigation was authorized." In fact, the 
Trustees devote more than four pages of their brief to their tilted 
argument regarding the Trustees authority to act imperfectly as 
they did in this case. 
Certainly the Association has the authority to sue. Further, 
Homeowners do not contend otherwise. What Homeowners contest in 
this case — which contention the Trustees clearly do not 
understand — is the manner in which the Trustees pursued this 
litigation. It is not disputed that the Trustees could have 
resorted to legal action to resolve the plumbing problems in this 
case. It is, however, disputed that the Trustees could divert and 
misappropriate funds, all while acting in secret, to pursue this 
legal action. Clearly, the Trustees have authority to sue and be 
sued. Clearer still, the manner in which the Trustees "sued" in 
this particular case, was in excess of the powers granted them and 
therefore "not within" the Trustees1 authority. 
The Trustees had no authority to go outside the express terms 
of the Declaration and Bylaws. The Trustees had no authority to 
authorize and fund from the Reserve Account an enormous and ill-
fated litigation expenditure. The Trustees had no authority to 
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repeatedly disregard the pleas and complaints from their neighbors, 
the homeowners whom they were elected to serve, regarding this 
diversion of funds. Finally, the Trustees had no authority to 
attempt to correct their misdeeds by foisting a special assessment 
on the collective owners after the owners had soundly defeated this 
"assessment." In the face of these, and numerous other egregious 
indiscretions, see Opening Brief at pp. 27-28, the Trustees claim 
that fl[t]here can be no question" but that the Trustees were 
authorized to divert funds from the Reserve Account, is 
unfathomable. 
The Trustees acted completely without authority in this case. 
They repeatedly engaged in ultra vires conduct for which Homeowners 
are entitled to relief. Viewing Homeowners1 Complaint in the light 
most favorable to Homeowners, this Court must reverse the district 
court's order of dismissal.9 
9
 Finally, in response to Point VI of the Trustees' Brief, 
Homeowners would agree the district court's "speculation" is 
irrelevant. Indeed, it is because the speculation was irrelevant 
and wholly outside the proceedings then before the court that the 
district court erred. As set forth in the Opening Brief, it was 
irrelevant for the lower court to "speculate" on issues and 
scenarios not raised in Homeowners1 Complaint and therefore not 
before the court. Further, it was error for the court to then use 
that speculation as a basis for dismissing Homeowners' Complaint. 
The lower court's speculation gave rise to an arbitrary denial of 
Homeowners' claim for relief which this Court must reverse. See In 
re Cruchelow, 926 P.2d 833, 834 (Utah 1996) (stating where trial 
court relied on its own "policy" to deny plaintiff's request for a 
name change, decision was based "purely on "unsupported 
generalizations and speculation'" and constituted an arbitrary 
denial of claim for relief). 
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CONCLPSION 
Pursuant to Rule 8(a), 8(e) and 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Homeowners1 Complaint alleges sufficient facts, 
which taken as true, reasonably and adequately support a claim upon 
which relief can be granted. The district court erred in 
dismissing this Complaint based upon speculation and conjecture and 
an inappropriate application of the law. In relevant part, 
Homeowners have plead sufficient facts to support both their tort 
and contract claims, as well as the Homeowners' entitlement to 
attorney fees. Therefore, Homeowners request that this Court 
reverse the lower court's order dismissing their Complaint, remand 
this case for further proceedings, and permit Homeowners their day 
in court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this L> I day of July, 1997. 
CAMPBELL, M^ACK & SESSIONS. 
E. BARNEY GESAS 
BRIDGET K. ROMANO 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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